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Abstract
This paper analyzes the role of yardstick competition for improving po-
litical decisions. We examine how performance comparisons across jurisdic-
tions aﬀect the agency problem resulting from uncertainty about politicians
(adverse selection) and their policies (moral hazard). We study two forms
of ineﬃciency: the provision of non-valuable programmes (over-provision)
and the failure to provide valuable programmes (under-provision). We
￿nd a general neutrality result: yardstick competition does not aﬀect the
chance that at least one type of politician in one jurisdiction will take
ineﬃcient decision, nor does it aﬀect the risk of underproviding good pro-
grammes. However, performance comparisons reduce the risk of providing
bad programmes in both jurisdictions.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In this paper we revolve around a fundamental question in political economics:
to what extent can elections and performance comparisons through yardstick
competition solve the political agency problem between the electorate and their
elected representatives?
Surely voters do think that some politicians are intrinsically more likely to
act in the public interest than others, and voters are interested in sorting out the
relatively good politicians. But everyone also recognizes that politicians make,
while in oﬃce, important policy choices that are not well monitored by the elec-
torate and, thus, that political agency involves moral hazard in a central way. A
theoretical model that captures this political agency problem simply but usefully
must combine the elements of adverse selection and moral hazard.1
Elections may be seen as a way for sorting good from bad incumbents. By
￿good incumbent￿, we mean someone who is honest, competent and not easily
bought oﬀ by special interests. However elections do not work well in controlling
and sorting politicians. There are severe problems in monitoring and evaluating
the incumbent￿s behavior in order to make informed decisions about whether
to reelect or not. Voters face a formidable agency problem because they are
inevitably poorly informed about politicians￿ behaviour and type. Moreover, the
electoral sanction (pass or fail) is such a crude incentive scheme that it can hardly
induce the politicians to do what the public wants.
Given the diﬃculty of the agency problem voters face, it might be reasonable
to try to organize competition among politicians for controlling problems of moral
hazard and adverse selection. In this respect, the Brennan and Buchanan (1980)
view is that decentralization is an eﬀective mechanism to control Leviathan￿s ex-
pansive tendencies. The basic argument is that competition among diﬀerent de-
centralized governments can exercise a disciplinary force and break the monopoly
power of a large central government. Comparing performances in oﬃce among
diﬀerent incumbents would help in sorting good types from bad types as well as
controlling moral hazard. In this view, one votes against an incumbent if his per-
formance is bad relative to others, in order to induce each incumbent to behave
in the public interest.
1Banks and Sundaram (1993) present an in￿nite horizon model that incorporates both el-
ements. Politicians are constrained to serve at most two terms and, as in Ferejohn (1986),
politicians￿ choice variable is eﬀort not policy. See Laﬀont (1998) for a nice review of political
agency theory whereas Shleifer and Vishny (1998) provide more focus on transition economics.
See also Przeworsky et al (1999) for a broader historical perspective of political agency prob-
lems.
2To analyze the nature and eﬀectiveness of this interaction, we consider a
multi-jurisdiction version of a political agency model due to Coate and Morris
(1995).2 In this model, the incumbent in each jurisdiction chooses a policy.
Then, the respective electorate, uninformed about the policy and the quality of
their incumbent, but informed about their relative performance, choose whether
to retain their representative. In the second (and last) period, if reelected, and
depending on his type, the incumbent chooses a transfer and the electorate receive
utility. A strategy for the electorate will be a rule stating whether or not to
reelect the incumbent according to their ￿rst-period welfare relative to the other
jurisdiction. This strategy will take the form of a relative performance criterion.
Note that voters are rationally seeking to in￿uence their future welfare with their
votes, so their retrospective vote has a prospective purpose.
The electorate face the decision problem of drawing an inference about the
incumbent￿s quality from their observed relative welfare and then reelecting if
the updated belief that the incumbent is good is suﬃciently high. This is a
simple matter of applying Bayes￿s rule. In turn the incumbent has to consider
the eﬀect of his policy choice and the policy choice in the other jurisdiction on
the probability of being reelected, which depends on the updated beliefs and the
reelection rule of the electorate.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium obtains in the model when the electorate in
each jurisdiction have correct expectation about the strategy their incumbent
(and the other incumbent) will employ, and choose whether to reelect their in-
cumbent according to this expectation. Furthermore, given the induced proba-
bility of reelection, no incumbent wants to change his strategy given the strategy
of the other incumbent.
With a single agency, Coate and Morris (1995) show that incumbent seeking
reelection may behave ineﬃciently in equilibrium either by providing non-valuable
projects or by not providing valuable ones.3 The aim of this paper is to exam-
ine how yardstick competition in￿uences the incentives to behave eﬃciently in
a multi-agency framework. Our ￿rst general result is that whatever the correla-
tion between agencies, yardstick competition does not aﬀect the risk that at least
one type of incumbent in one jurisdiction behaves ineﬃciently (Proposition 1).
2This model diﬀers from other political agency models (like Ferejohn, 1986 or Banks and
Sundaram, 1993) by the fact that ineﬃcient behavior is more likely the higher the value of
holding oﬃce. This is because bad incumbents seeking reelection would rather make transfer
to special interests in the form of ineﬃcient public projects rather than more apparent cash
transfers. For the same reason, shorter term limits or repeated elections have the paradoxical
eﬀect of encouraging ineﬃcient behavior.
3See Alesina et al (1998) for evidence of the use of public employment as an indirect and
possibly ineﬃcient method of redistributiuon.
3Therefore, yardstick competition cannot make this general ineﬃciency less likely.4
However, focusing on the ineﬃciency arising from the provision of non-valuable
projects, we ￿nd that this sort of ineﬃciency is less likely under yardstick compe-
tition (Proposition 2). We also show that there cannot be an equilibrium in which
bad incumbents condition their decision to implement bad projects on the type
of project or politician in the other jurisdiction (Propositions 3 and 4). As for
the other ineﬃciency arising from not providing valuable projects, we ￿nd that
yardstick competition is powerless (Proposition 5) and that any such equilibrium
must involve both good and bad incumbents acting the same way (Proposition 6).
This paper is related to the emerging literature on yardstick competition in
political agency, speci￿cally the papers by Besley and Case (1995) and Besley
and Smart (2001). The former paper provides empirical support to the idea
that voters use relative performance criterion in deciding whether to retain or
not their incumbent. The latter paper is more theoretical and shows that the
eﬃciency eﬀect of yardstick competition can go either way depending on the initial
reputation of the incumbent. The ambiguity arises essentially from a trade-oﬀ
between motivation and selection. The distinctive feature of our analysis is that
t h ee l e c t o r a li n c e n t i v ea n dt h ed e s i r ef o rr e e l e c t i o na r et h e m s e l v e st h es o u r c eo f
ineﬃciency and we assess the role of yardstick comparison in this context.5
The model used to assess the eﬀect of yardstick competition is set out in
the next section. The general neutrality result is presented and discussed in
Section 3. The impact of yardstick competition on the overprovision ineﬃciency
is examined in Section 4, while its impact on the underprovision ineﬃciency is
s t u d i e di nS e c t i o n5 .S o m ec o n c l u d i n gr e m a r k sa r ec o n t a i n e di nS e c t i o n6 .
2 A multi-jurisdiction political agency model
We use a two-period political agency model due to Coate and Morris (1995)
(hereafter CM) that we extend to two agencies (jurisdictions) so that in a corre-
lated environment, voters can use a relative performance criterion (i.e., yardstick
competition) to decide whether or not to reelect their incumbent. In the ￿rst
period, both incumbents choose independently and simultaneously whether or
not to implement a public project, and whether or not to make cash transfers to
4This contrasts with the principal-agent theory in which the possibility to use a more general
incentive scheme than the crude electoral sanction enables yardstick competition to restore
eﬃciency (see Shleifer, 1985 and Holmstrom, 1981). However Meyer and Vickers (1997) provide
more ambiguous results in a dynamic principal-agent framework.
5For evidence that politicians are strongly motivated by the desire for reelection, see Cain
et al (1987).
4some ￿special interest￿. Each incumbent may be either ￿good￿ or ￿bad￿: a good
incumbent always behaves in the interest of his electorate, while a bad incumbent
may do rent-seeking at the expense of his electorate. An incumbent cannot aﬀord
to alienate his electorate if he wants to be reelected at the end of the ￿rst period.
The problem for voters is to distinguish a good from a bad incumbent on the
basis of the ￿rst-period decision and realized performance of their own incumbent
relative to the decision and performance of the other incumbent. In the second
period, the incumbent, if reelected, simply selects a cash transfer to the special
interest.
At the beginning of the game, nature selects an incumbent type in each juris-
diction. Incumbent is good with probability λI ∈ [0,1] and bad with probability
1 − λI in the domestic jurisdiction (the corresponding probabilities in the other
jurisdiction are ￿ λI and 1−￿ λI, respectively). Then nature selects a project quality
in each jurisdiction according to some joint distribution π. There is uncertainty
about the bene￿t of any project. However a valuable project is more likely to pro-
duce a high net bene￿t to the voters than a non-valuable project. More precisely,
a valuable project produces a high net bene￿t BH with probability θ1 ∈ [0,1] and
al o wn e tb e n e ￿t BL with probability 1−θ1 (with BL < 0 <B H). A non-valuable
project produces the same high net bene￿t BH but with a lower probability θ0
(with 0 ≤ θ0 < θ1 ≤ 1). To simplify the analysis we assume that the joint
probability distribution of project types, π(θ,θ), is symmetric:
π(θ0,θ0)=π(θ1,θ1)=ρ/2,
π(θ0,θ1)=π(θ1,θ0)=( 1− ρ)/2.
We focus here on the case where 1/2 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, so that there is positive (or no)
correlation between the two jurisdictions. Naturally, in the absence of correla-
tion (ρ =1 /2), no useful information is transmitted through the record of the
other jurisdiction and the model is then essentially the same as CM with the
juxtaposition of two independent agencies.6
There is asymmetric information between the incumbents and voters inso-
far as incumbents know more about their type and the desirability of a public
project: incumbents, but not voters, observe θ = {θ0,θ1} before deciding whether
to implement the project or not. For simplicity we shall also assume that there is
symmetric information between politicians (i.e., each politician knows the politi-
cian and project type in the other jurisdiction).
6We do not loose any generality by making these assumptions. We can show that all our
results go through under the (less natural) assumption of negative correlation between the
jursidictions (0 ≤ ρ < 1/2), or with a more general distribution of project types (where, for
instance, positive correlation is de￿ned as π(θ0,θ0)π(θ1,θ1) > π(θ1,θ0)2).
5In each jurisdiction the expected net bene￿t for the risk-neutral voters from a
project of quality θ is equal to B(θ)=θBH +( 1− θ)BL. Moreover, both types
of project produce a rent R>0 for a special interest group. We make the same
assumption as CM.
Assumption 1 (i) B(θ1) > 0,( i i )B(θ0) < −R<0.
P a r t( i )s a y st h a tav a l u a b l ep r o j e c t( θ = θ1) produces positive expected
bene￿t to the voters. Part (ii) says that a non-valuable project (θ = θ0) yields
negative expected bene￿t to the voters which exceeds the rent the interest group
derives from this project; as a result, the voters would prefer to pay directly cash
transfer of R to the special interest instead of having the project implemented (if
they could credibly commit doing so).
In addition to the implementation of a project, each incumbent can also choose
to make a cash transfer T ≥ 0 from the voters to the interest group. A good
politician (i = g) cares only about the expected welfare of the voters and about
being in oﬃce. Thus, his ￿rst-period utility is vg(B(θ)−T) or vg(−T), depending
on his decision to implement or not a project of type θ = {θ0,θ1} and to make
ac a s ht r a n s f e rT ≥ 0 to the interest group. Preference for being in oﬃce rather
than out is re￿ected by vg(0) > 0.
A bad politician (i = b), on the other hand, also cares about the interest group
and his utility is vb(B(θ) − T,R+ T) or vb(−T,+T), depending on his decision
to implement or not a project of type θ ∈ {θ0,θ1} and to make a cash transfer
T ≥ 0 t ot h ei n t e r e s tg r o u p . W ea s s u m et h a tvb(.,.) is smooth and increasing
in both arguments and that vb(0,0) > 0 is the value of holding oﬃce for the
bad incumbent. Let v∗
b(B(θ1),R) ≡ maxT vb(B(θ1) − T,R + T) with optimal
cash transfer T = T1 and similarly, v∗
b(0,0) ≡ maxT vb(−T,+T) with optimal
cash transfer T = T0. As in CM we make the following two assumptions on the
preference of a bad politician in the two jurisdictions (with δ ∈ [0,1] representing
the incumbents￿ discount factor).
Assumption 2 vb(B(θ0),R) >v b(0,0).
Assumption 3 (i) v∗
b(B(θ1),R) − vb(B(θ1),R) < δv∗
b(0,0),
(ii) v∗
b(0,0) − vb(0,0) < δv∗
b(0,0).
Assumption 2 says that ignoring the reelection constraint, a bad incumbent
wants to implement a bad project, at the expense of the voters, if it gives a rent R
to the interest group . Assumption 3 says that the bad incumbent always prefers
to give up the optimal cash transfer or the bad project in the ￿rst period if he
6could be reelected for sure and then implement the optimal cash transfer in the
next period.
Upon observing the project type θ, an incumbent of type i ∈ {g,b} makes a
project and cash transfer decision, possibly contingent on the politician or project
type in the other jurisdiction. A ￿rst-period strategy for the incumbent in any
jurisdiction speci￿es a project and transfer decision for each type of incumbent
(i ∈ {g,b}) and each realization of project type in that jurisdiction (θ ∈ {θ0,θ1})
based on his (perfect) information Θ about the politician and project type in the
other jurisdiction: si(θ;Θ) ∈ {P,N}￿R+,w h e r eP (N) denotes (no) project
implementation.7 Then, when the project of type θ is implemented, nature selects
its net bene￿tt ot h ev o t e r sa se i t h e rBH with probability θ or BL with probability
1−θ. Voters observe their incumbent￿s ￿rst-period record R =( D,T,B),a sw e l l
as the other incumbent￿s record ￿ R =(￿ D, ￿ T, ￿ B) (with D ∈ {P, N}, B ∈ {BL,B H}
for D = P and B =0for D = N). On the basis of these observations, voters
use Bayes￿ rule to update their initial belief (λI) that their incumbent is good as
α(R, ￿ R) ∈ [0,1], which also denotes the probability that they will reelect their
incumbent. If reelected, and depending on his type, the incumbent makes a cash
transfer decision and the game ends. There is no project decision to be made in
the second period.
We solve the game for its perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE). A PBE consists
in a pair of strategies for the two incumbents, a reelection rule and beliefs for the
voters that meet the following requirements: (i) each incumbent chooses a strat-
egy that maximizes his discounted utility given the other incumbent￿s strategy,
the voters￿ beliefs and the reelection decision rule; (ii) given their updated beliefs,
voters￿ in each jurisdiction base their reelection decision on minimizing the cash
transfer in the second period; (iii) voters￿ beliefs in each jurisdiction are updated
using Bayes￿ rule, according to the two incumbents￿ strategies where possible.
Like CM, we re￿ne the equilibrium concept by requiring out-of-equilibrium
beliefs to be consistent with the following monotonicity criterion (monotone be-
liefs):g i v e n t w o ￿rst-period records R =( D,T,B) and R0 =( D,T0,B) with
T 0 >Tin one jurisdiction, associated with the same record ￿ R in the other ju-
risdiction, posterior belief is such that α(R0, ￿ R) < α(R, ￿ R). The logic of this
criterion is that posterior belief should re￿ect the fact that a bad type is more
likely to deviate from the equilibrium play to make higher cash transfers. This
monotonicity requirement implies that a good politician will never make cash
transfers since this would only hurt his reputation without bringing any bene￿t.
It follows that by making cash transfers the bad politician will reveal himself
7Recall that we assume symmetric information between politicians.
7and thus he would rather choose optimal cash transfers if any (i.e., T0 when the
project is non-valuable and T1 when the project is valuable). The latter two con-
clusions are valid for the ￿rst period, as well as for the second period (supposing
that the incumbent is reelected).
3 General neutrality result
In this section we want to examine whether performance comparisons and the
resulting competition among politicians may reduce the chance that at least one
type of incumbent in one jurisdiction behaves ineﬃciently. By ineﬃcient decision
we mean either undertaking bad projects or dropping good ones. The following
proposition states that yardstick competition does not make this general ineﬃ-
ciency less likely.
Proposition 1 Under assumptions 1-3, for each jurisdiction, there exists some
￿ λ < 1 such that, in any PBE with monotone beliefs, at least one type of incumbent
behaves ineﬃciently in one jurisdiction if λI > ￿ λ. The threshold ￿ λ is independent
of the correlation between jurisdictions.
Proof. See Appendix 7.1.
The intuition for Proposition 1 goes as follows. Suppose, by contradiction,
eﬃcient behavior from both types in one jurisdiction. If the initial reputation of
the incumbent exceeds ￿ λ, bad incumbents have good chance of reelection and do
n o tw a n tt ol o s ei tb ym a k i n gc a s ht r a n s f e rt ot h es p e c i a li n t e r e s t . T h e nb o t h
types are pooling on the same (eﬃcient) action and no information is revealed by
the fact that the project is implemented or not since both are compatible with
the equilibrium play. Hence, posterior belief following any decision to implement
in one jurisdiction is simply the prior belief irrespective of what is happening in
the other jurisdiction. This is true whatever the degree of correlation between
projects. But then since there cannot be reputation loss from simply implement-
ing a project, this will give the incentive to a bad incumbent to deviate from the
equilibrium by implementing non-valuable projects. Therefore, when the initial
reputation is suﬃciently good to deter bad incumbents from using cash transfers,
all types behaving eﬃciently cannot be an equilibrium and, thus, at least one
type of incumbent will behave ineﬃciently.
The novel￿and striking￿result of this proposition is that the critical initial rep-
utation above which equilibrium cannot involve eﬃcient behavior is independent
of the degree of correlation. In that sense, yardstick competition in an imperfectly
8correlated environment does not aﬀect the chance that at least one type of incum-
bent in one jurisdiction behaves ineﬃciently.8 This ￿nding is a natural feature
of a more fundamental trade-oﬀ between motivation and selection:t h eb e t t e rt h e
p e r f o r m a n c eo fb a dt y p e si nt h e￿rst-period, the harder it is to sort good from
bad for the second-period.
To um up the argument: yardstick competition is powerless to induce overall
eﬃcient behaviour because this requires both types in all jurisdictions pooling
on the same action so that voters cannot gain any useful information from per-
formance comparisons whatever the correlation among jurisdictions. It follows
that the neutrality result is very general indeed: it holds whatever the number of
jurisdictions, the degree of correlation between jurisdictions, and the information
incumbents have about each other.
As a corollary to the previous argument, we would expect yardstick compe-
tition to have some eﬀect only in situations where the two types of incumbents
behave diﬀerently. We examine situations of this sort in the next section.
4 Implementation of bad projects
We have seen that if the politicians￿ initial reputation is high enough and cor-
relation is imperfect, at least one type of incumbent in at least one jurisdiction
behaves ineﬃciently. The ineﬃciency can take two forms: either undertaking
bad projects (overprovision) or not providing good projects (underprovision).
Our task is now to see how in an imperfectly correlated environment, yardstick
competition could aﬀect the occurrence of these two forms of ineﬃciency. This
section is devoted to overprovision while the next section deals with underprovi-
sion.
Regarding overprovision, we consider the following strategy in which bad in-
cumbents implement non-valuable projects irrespective of the situation (types of
politician and project) in the other jurisdiction.
8The opposite result holds in the limit case of perfect correlation between project types
in the two jursidictions (ρ =1 ). To see this, consider that voters observe the following: no
cash transfers are made and the project is not undertaken in the other jurisdiction. Expecting
politicians to behave eﬃciently, voters infer that the project is bad in that jurisdiction and thus
(by perfect correlation), that the project must also be bad in their own jurisdiction. Therefore,
deviating from the equilibrium play by undertaking the project, the bad incumbent would reveal
himself and forego any chance of reelection. But, following Proposition 1, we know that this
cannot be optimal if the initial reputation is suﬃciently high (i.e., λI > ￿ λ) since the incumbent
has then good chance of being reelected. It follows that with perfect correlation, both types
of incumbent behaving eﬃciently is an equilibrium if the initial reputation is suﬃciently high
(λI > ￿ λ).
9De￿nition 1 Strategy S is such that, for any con￿gurations of politician and
project in the other jurisdiction, (i) both types of incumbent make no cash trans-
fers, (ii) good incumbent implements valuable project only (iii) bad incumbent
implements both valuable and non-valuable projects.
We now demonstrate that such strategy constitutes an equilibrium behavior
on the part of the incumbents if the initial reputation of the incumbent is suﬃ-
ciently high, but that yardstick competition makes this kind of equilibrium less
likely to arise (and in fact impossible in a perfectly correlated environment). We
proceed in three steps. First, we compute the posterior beliefs induced by strat-
egy S. Second, we derive the reelection probabilities. Third, we prove that given
the induced probability of reelection, it is optimal for both types of incumbent
to play strategy S when the incumbent in the other jurisdiction acts the same.
4.1 Posterior beliefs
From strategy S, incumbents do not make cash transfers and the possible records
in each jurisdiction are (P,0,B H), (P,0,B L),a n d(N,0,0), yielding 3￿3 diﬀerent
record pro￿les. We need to derive voters￿ beliefs that their incumbent is good for
each record pro￿le. That is, we must update voters￿ initial beliefs using Bayes rule
according to incumbent strategy S. To simplify notation (when no confusion is
possible), we identify the records (P,0,B H), (P,0,B L) and (N,0,0) respectively
by H, L,a n dN. Using this notation, the posterior belief that the domestic
incumbent is good for any record pro￿le (R, ￿ R) ∈ {H,L,N}￿{ H,L,N} is
αij =
λI
λI +( 1− λI)
¡
1+φij
¢ ∀i,j ∈ {H,L,N}
where φij is a measure of the reputational cost (i.e., αij ≤ λI ⇐⇒ φij ≥ 0).
Straightforward but tedious calculations establish the following (with ￿ λI denoting
the incumbent￿s initial reputation in the other jurisdiction):
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Thus, there is always a reputational cost to implement any project because bad
politicians are more likely to implement than good politicians. Since a bad politi-
cian always implements, a good politician can reveal himself by not undertaking
10the project, and thus
φNH = φNL = φNN = −1,
so that αNH = αNL = αNN =1(the non-implementation decision guarantees
reelection). When there is no correlation (i.e., ρ =1 /2) the model is similar to
CM and the reputation costs from undertaking the project does not depend on
the outcome of the project in the other jurisdiction:
0 < φHH = φHL = φHN =
θ0
θ1




Straightforward comparisons of posterior beliefs highlight a number of instruc-
tive results. First, there is a direct reputational eﬀect: regardless of the outcome
in the other jurisdiction, (i) a good performance BH improves reputation relative
to bad performance BL (because bad politicians undertake non-valuable projects,
which are more likely to fail) and (ii) undertaking the project reduces reputation
relative to no implementation (because bad politicians are more likely to imple-
ment); i.e.,
αLK < αHK < λI < αNK =1 ∀K = H,L,N.
This direct reputational eﬀect is already present in CM￿s analysis. However, in a
correlated environment, voters observe a relative performance that is not directly
controlled by their incumbent. As a result, a second, indirect, reputational eﬀect
(or informational externality) appears in our model. It says that for any given
domestic record, the reputation of the domestic politician also depends on the
record of the politician in the other jurisdiction. More precisely, we have the
following rankings (∀K = H,L):
‰
αKN < αKL < αKH if ρ > 1/2,
αKN = αKL = αKH ≡ αK if ρ =1 /2,
(1)
(where αH and αL denote the posterior beliefs in an uncorrelated environment
when respectively high and low bene￿t are observed). In words, when there is
positive correlation, the reputation of the domestic incumbent undertaking the
project is the lowest when the project is not undertaken in the other jurisdiction
and the highest when the project is undertaken and is a success in the other
jurisdiction. The intuition is the following. Not undertaking the project in the
other jurisdiction reveals that it was a non-valuable project which by positive
correlation makes it more likely that the domestic project is also bad. Since only
bad incumbent implements non-valuable projects, undertaking the project leads
11voters to believe that their incumbent is bad. On the other hand, observing
a successful project in the other jurisdiction increases the chance that it was a
valuable project (since it is more likely to succeed) which, by positive correlation,
increases the chance that the domestic project is also good and therefore, that it
could have been implemented by a good politician. In this case the reputation
cost for undertaking the project is less than when the project is not undertaken
in the other jurisdiction. Obviously, the stronger the correlation, the more re-
sponsive is the posterior belief to the outcome the in the other jurisdiction (i.e.,
the diﬀerences αKH − αKL and αKL − αKN both increase with ρ).
To assess more precisely the eﬀect of correlation, we compare the posterior
beliefs in a correlated and in an uncorrelated environments. As illustrated by the
following ranking (with K = H or L), positive correlation improves the incum-
bent￿s reputation when a valuable project is implemented in the other region, but
hurts it in the case of no implementation:9
αKN < αK < αKH if ρ > 1/2. (2)
Lastly, it is easily seen that posterior beliefs are increasing with the prior
belief λI (unless, of course, when the posterior is 1).
4.2 Reelection probability
We can now derive the (ex ante) probability of reelection of each type of incum-
bent as a function of the type of the other incumbent and the project pro￿le.10
￿ When (θ,￿ θ)=( θ1,θ0), the domestic project is valuable and from strategy
S, both types of incumbent act in the same way (undertaking the project)
while in the other jurisdiction, the project is non-valuable leading both
types of incumbents to act diﬀerently (i.e., the good type does not imple-
ment whereas the bad type does). Therefore, the probability of reelection
of the domestic incumbent is independent of his type due to pooling but
9How posterior beliefs respond to a low bene￿t in the other jurisdiction is ambiguous. Indeed,
upon observing a low bene￿t in the other jurisdiction, posterior beliefs when undertaking the
project (regardless of its outcome) are higher in a positively correlated environment (i.e., αHL >
αH andαLL > αL) if and only if 1 − θ1 > (1 − θ0)(1 − λI). This condition means that a low
bene￿t is more likely to arise from the failure of a good project (always undertaken) rather
than from the failure of a bad project (only undertaken if the incumbent is bad).
10The (ex ante) probability of reelection is before the outcomes are observed, while the
posterior belief is the ex post probability of reelection once outcomes are realized.
12depends on the type of the other politician:∀i ∈ {g,b}.
pi(θ1;θ0,g)=θ1αHN +( 1− θ1)αLN
pi(θ1;θ0,b)=θ1 [θ0αHH +( 1− θ0)αHL]
+(1 − θ1)[θ0αLH +( 1− θ0)αLL] (3)
￿ When (θ,￿ θ)=( θ1,θ1), the project is valuable in both jurisdictions and from
strategy S, both types of incumbents pool on the same action (undertaking
the project) in both jurisdictions. Therefore, the probability of reelection
of the domestic incumbent is independent of his own type and of the other
politician￿s type:∀i ∈ {g,b},
pi(θ1;θ1,j)=θ1 [θ1αHH +( 1− θ1)αHL]
+(1 − θ1)[θ1αLH +( 1− θ1)αLL]
￿ When (θ,￿ θ)=( θ0,θ0), the project is non-valuable in both jurisdictions and
by strategy S, both types of incumbent in each jurisdiction separate on
diﬀerent actions (the good type does not implement revealing himself as a
good type, while the bad type implements). Therefore, the probability of
reelection of the domestic politician depends both on his own type and on
the other politician￿s type:
pb(θ0;θ0,g)=θ0αHN +( 1− θ0)αLN,
pb(θ0;θ0,b)=θ0 [θ0αHH +( 1− θ0)αHL]
+(1 − θ0)[θ0αLH +( 1− θ0)αLL],
pg(θ0;θ0,g)=pg(θ0;θ0,b)=1 .
￿ When (θ,￿ θ)=( θ0,θ1), both types of incumbents act the same in the other
jurisdiction (both undertaking the project) and the probability of reelection
of the domestic politician is independent of the other politician￿s type (with
the good incumbent revealing himself by not implementing the non-valuable
project):∀j ∈ {g,b}
pb(θ0,θ1,j)=θ0 [θ1αHH +( 1− θ1)αHL]
+(1 − θ0)[θ1αLH +( 1− θ1)αLL] ,
pg(θ0,θ1,j)=1
￿ Lastly, in the absence of correlation (ρ =1 /2, which corresponds to the
single-jurisdiction model), there is no informational externality and the
13probabilities of reelection induced by strategy S are
pb(θ0)=θ0αH +( 1− θ0)αL,
pg(θ0)=1
pb(θ1)=pg(θ1)=θ1αH +( 1− θ1)αL.
Building on the rankings of posteriors (1) and (2), we can order the probabil-
ities of reelection for the two types of incumbents when they comply to strategy
S. The next lemma summarizes our main results.
Lemma 1 In the presence of positive correlation between the two jurisdictions
(ρ > 1/2), a bad incumbent playing strategy S faces probabilities of reelection that
depend on the situation in the other jurisdiction as follows: ∀ θ ∈ {θ0,θ1},
(i) pb(θ,θ0,g) <p b(θ;θ0,b) <p b(θ;θ1,g)=pb(θ;θ1,b),
(ii) pb(θ;θ0,g) <p b(θ).
According to part (i), a bad incumbent has the lowest chance to be reelected
when the other project is non-valuable and the other politician is good (since,
then, the project is not undertaken in the jurisdiction making voters suspicious
about the domestic implementation). Part (ii) says that in this worst-case sce-
nario (non-valuable project and good incumbent abroad), the bad domestic in-
cumbent is clearly hurt by the voters￿ ability to compare performance in the two
jurisdictions.
Note that the reelection prospects of a good incumbent are ranked in the same
way when the project is valuable (and thus undertaken). However, when the
project is non-valuable, the good incumbent reveals himself by not undertaking
the project and thus get reelected with certainty irrespective of the situation in
the other jurisdiction (i.e., pg(θ0;θ,j)=1∀θ,j).
4.3 Eﬀect of yardstick competition
We are now in a position to check whether yardstick competition in a correlated
environment can eﬀectively reinforce the ability of voters to restrain bad incum-
bents undertaking non-valuable projects. We proceed in two steps. First, we
derive the minimum initial reputation beyond which it is optimal for both types
of politicians to play strategy S. The argument is the same as in CM. If a bad
incumbent makes cash transfer in the ￿rst-period, he would reveal himself and
destroy his chance of reelection. This would not deter him from making cash
transfer if his initial reputation was so low that he had few chances of being
14reelected. But when his initial reputation is high enough, he has good chance
of being reelected, giving him an incentive to give up cash transfers for a less
transparent (but ineﬃcient) redistribution to the special interest in the form of
non-valuable projects.
The second step consists in showing that in a correlated environment yard-
stick competition increases the minimum initial reputation which required for the
i n c u m b e n tt op l a ys t r a t e g yS .T h u s ,y a r d s t i c kc o m p e t i t i o ne ﬀectively reduces the
incentive for undertaking non-valuable projects. This result supports the conven-
tional wisdom that yardstick comparisons transmit valuable information about
the type of incumbent and the quality of his decisions. The higher the degree of
correlation the greater the incentive for the bad incumbent (seeking reelection)
to choose a policy in the public interest.
To shed some light on this result, we need to understand how the minimum
initial reputation is derived and how the degree of correlation aﬀects this thresh-
old. As already mentioned, to ensure that both types of incumbent behave as
prescribed by strategy S, their reelection probability when playing strategy S
must be high enough; since reelection probabilities increase, ceteris paribus,w i t h
the initial reputation, this amounts to say that the initial reputation must be
high enough. Since strategy S prescribes actions for both types of incumbent
that are independent of the situation in the other jurisdiction, both types of
incumbent must ￿nd it optimal to play these actions for all possible con￿gura-
tions of projects and politician types in the other jurisdiction, and in particular
for the most unfavorable situation. From part (i) of Lemma 1, we know that
the prospect of reelection is worst when the incumbent faces a good politician
with non-valuable project. We further know, from part (ii) of that lemma, that
greater correlation makes this worst reelection prospect even worse by increasing
the ability of voters to detect bad incumbents.
Our main result about the desirable eﬀect of yardstick comparisons to restrain
(bad) incumbent undertaking non-valuable project is described formally in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1-3, there exists λ
∗(ρ) < 1 ∀ ρ ∈ [0,1[ such




∗(1/2) ∀ρ > 1/2.A tt h e l i m i t ,λ
∗(1) = 1 making a
PBE involving incumbent strategy S in both jurisdictions impossible
Proof. See Appendix 7.2.
The interpretation of this proposition is that yardstick competition can reduce
(and even eliminate in case of perfect correlation) the risk of undertaking bad
15projects by improving the ability of voters to detect those policy choices that are
not in their interest, as well as the bad incumbents who make such choices. This
result ￿ts nicely with what seems to be the most popular argument for yardstick
competition and performance comparisons. To see this more clearly, suppose ￿rst
that there is no correlation between jurisdiction so that no information is revealed
about the type of the incumbent from the policy outcome in the other jurisdiction.
In this context, a bad incumbent seeking reelection with a good initial reputation
may rely on bad (ineﬃcient) projects to redistribute in favor of some special
interest, instead of foregoing reelection by making explicit cash transfers. This
follows from the stochastic relationships between project types and outcomes
(i.e., non-valuable projects have some chance of success while valuable projects
might fail). However, in a correlated environment, voters have the additional
possibility of drawing inference about the quality of their incumbent from the
policy outcome in the other jurisdiction. Not undertaking the project in the other
jurisdiction reveals that it is a non-valuable project and given positive correlation,
voters would infer that the domestic project is likely to be bad, reducing the
chance of reelection of the incumbent undertaking it. Hence, incumbents will
have lower incentive to implement non-valuable projects that are more easily
detected through performance comparison.
Naturally, relative performance is a noisy and fallible signal for the electorate.
Since voters observe a relative performance that is not directly controlled by the
incumbent, yardstick comparison adds an extra noise in the electorate￿s ability to
assess whether politicians are choosing policies in the public interest. Yardstick
comparisons increase the risk of rewarding a bad incumbent undertaking non-
valuable project (Type I error) and punishing a good incumbent who has worked
in the public interest (type II error). This is easily seen by comparing the chances
of reelection with and without yardstick competition.
The results are summarized in Table 1 where a 0 means no diﬀerence, a +
means a greater chance of reelection with yardstick competition and a − means
a lower chance of reelection with yardstick competition.
Other region
Good Bad
θ0 θ1 θ0 θ1
Good θ0 0 0 0 0
Domestic θ1 ￿ + + +
region θ0 ￿ + + +
Bad θ1 ￿ + + +
Table 1. Impact of yardstick comparison on chance of reelection of domestic
incumbent (positive correlation)
16Table 1 reveals that yardstick competition actually reduces the chance of
reelection of a bad incumbent only if the other incumbent is good with a non-
valuable project. This raises the question of whether the bad incumbent could
to some extent neutralize the eﬀect of yardstick competition by conditioning his
decision to the type of politician and project in the other jurisdiction.
4.4 Contingent decision
We have established that a bad incumbent is less likely to undertake non-valuable
projects when voters use comparative performance across jurisdictions to assess
the quality of their incumbent. We have derived this result by assuming that the
bad incumbent is undertaking non-valuable project independently of the other
politician and project types. This implies for instance that voters can more easily
detect a bad incumbent when the other politician is good.
We now explore the possibility for the bad incumbent to condition his ac-
tion upon the situation in the other jurisdiction. We investigate whether the
bad incumbent has an incentive to try and alleviate the adverse eﬀect of yard-
stick comparisons by conditioning his decision to undertake non-valuable project
either on the other politician￿s type or on the other project￿s quality. At ￿rst
glance, one might think that in a positively correlated environment, a bad in-
cumbent would have a higher incentive to behave eﬃciently when facing a good
politician or a non-valuable project. However, these conjectures turn out to be
mistaken. We show indeed that there cannot be an equilibrium in which the
bad incumbent behaves eﬃciently or not depending either on the project type in
the other jurisdiction (project-based contingency) or on the politician type in the
other jurisdiction (politician-based contingency).
Let us ￿rst examine whether the type of project in the other jurisdiction can
in￿uence the behavior of a bad incumbent. We consider the following strategy.
De￿nition 2 The project-based strategy S1 is the same as strategy S ex-
cept that the bad incumbent does not implement non-valuable project if the other
project is bad.
The logic underlying this strategy is that there is a reputation cost to imple-
ment (voters are suspicious about those who implement projects because the bad
type is more likely to do so) but that this cost is lower (voters are less suspicious)
in a positively correlated environment when the other politician also implements
(which is always the case when the project is valuable). It turns out, however, that
this strategy cannot be part of an equilibrium. The intuition behind this result
is very similar to the one behind Proposition 1. Consider that the project is not
17undertaken in the other jurisdiction. Voters infer that it has to be a non-valuable
project. But then, there cannot be any reputation loss from implementing the
project at home (since voters expect both types of incumbent to pool on the same
action), which leads the bad incumbent to deviate by implementing non-valuable
project even when the project is bad in the other jurisdiction. As argued above
in the discussion of Proposition 1, the argument is rather general: in particular,
it holds whatever the strategy adopted by the politician in the other jurisdiction.
We record our result in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 Under Assumptions 1-2, there cannot be a PBE involving a project-
based strategy S1 in any jurisdiction
Now let us examine whether conditioning on the type of the other politician
could be an equilibrium strategy. We consider the following strategy.
De￿nition 3 The politician-based strategy S2 is the same as strategy S ex-
cept that the bad incumbent does not implement non-valuable project if the other
incumbent is good.
Strategy S2 implies that the bad incumbent behaves ineﬃc i e n t l yo n l yi ft h e
other incumbent is bad. The logic underlying this strategy is that undertaking
non-valuable project is more easily detected when the other incumbent is good.
Again one might think that it could be worth for the bad incumbent to behave
in such a way. However, it turns out again that the conjecture is mistaken.
The argument goes as follows. Suppose that politicians in both jurisdictions
adopt strategy S2. If the project is good in the other jurisdiction, then it will
be implemented whatever the type of the politician. But since good and bad
politicians pool on the same action, the chance of reelection of the domestic
incumbent is independent of the other politician type. It then follows that a
bad politician would not ￿nd pro￿table to condition his decision on the type of
the politician in the other region. Therefore, strategy S2 cannot be part of an
equilibrium, as recorded in the next proposition.11
Proposition 4 Under Assumption 1, there cannot be a PBE involving a policy-
b a s e ds t r a t e g yS 2i nb o t hj u r i s d i c t i o n s .
11Extending the reasoning behind Proposition 4, we can expect the following, more general,
result: any strategy that dictates some type of politician to implement a non-valuable project
or not depending on the other politician￿s type in some environment (θ,￿ θ)c a n n o tb ep a r to fa
PBE if, in this particular environment (θ,￿ θ), the other politician￿s strategy is to act the same
whatever his type
185 Non implementation of valuable projects
In this section, we examine the impact of yardstick comparisons on the risk that
politicians seeking reelection may not undertake valuable projects. The reason
for this underprovision ineﬃciency is that politicians choose policies but not out-
comes. A project that is good ex ante can fail ex post, leading the electorate to
decrease its estimate that the incumbent is good. This is potentially worse when
voters assess the quality of their incumbent from their relative performance since
this adds an extra noise. Could it be that yardstick competition in the electoral
process provides eﬀective incentives to restrain spending on non-valuable projects
but at the cost of refraining spending on valuable projects? In other words, is it
possible that dissuading politicians to take decisions that are not in the public
interest may, at the same time, dissuade them to take decisions that are in the
public interest but whose (relative) outcome is uncertain?
Our ￿rst result is a generalization of Proposition 3 in CM to a correlated
environment. It requires the following assumption.12
Assumption 4 (i) vg(B(θ1)) − vg(0) < δvg(0), (ii) v∗
b(B(θ1),R) − vb(0,0) <
δv∗
b(0,0).
This assumption says that both types of incumbent are willing to forego the
utility gain of implementing a valuable project if this could guarantee them reelec-
tion. De￿ning ﬂ λ as the maximum of [vg(B(θ1))−vg(0)]/δvg(0) and [v∗
b(B(θ1),R)−
vb(0,0)]/δv∗
b(0,0), we can state the following result.
Proposition 5 Under assumptions 1-4, there exists a PBE involving no cash
transfers and no project implementation by both types of incumbent in both juris-
dictions if λI > ﬂ λ. Moreover ﬂ λ ∈ (0,1) is independent of the degree of correlation
ρ.
The proof of the ￿rst part is a straightforward extension of the proof of Propo-
sition 3 in CM. The basic argument is the following: when the initial reputation
is high, reelection is relatively likely and, by Assumption 5, both types of incum-
bent care enough about being reelected to forego the bene￿t of implementing
valuable projects. The novel￿and striking-result is the second statement about
the neutrality of yardstick competition. Here, the argument is akin to the one
used in Propositions 1 and 3: since both types pool on the same action, the
policy outcomes transmit no information on the quality of the incumbent and
12This is the equivalent of Assumption 5 in CM.
19the correlation between jurisdiction has no eﬀect on each incumbent￿s probabil-
ity of reelection. As a result, yardstick comparisons do not aﬀect the force of the
electoral sanction.
The question arises, then, of whether correlation and comparative perfor-
mance could aﬀect the underprovision of valuable projects if both types of in-
cumbents were choosing diﬀerent actions (since, as suggested by Proposition 2,
comparing policy outcomes would reveal something about the type of the incum-
bent). Surprisingly, the answer is no. Indeed, there is no equilibrium in which
the good incumbent refrains from undertaking any project (either good or bad)
and the bad incumbent chooses to implement at least one type of project. The
intuition for this is simple. If the good incumbent never undertakes the project,
the bad incumbent would reveal himself by undertaking any project. Facing no
chance of reelection whatsoever, the bad incumbent makes thus cash transfers
without any reservation. But then, since voters do not expect good incumbents
to make cash transfers, there is no reputational penalty for a good incumbent
to undertake a project without cash transfers. Therefore (by Assumption 1),
a good incumbent would deviate and implement a valuable project. We have
demonstrated the following result.
Proposition 6 Under Assumption 1, there is no PBE in which, in each juris-
diction, the good incumbent never implements any type of projects while the bad
incumbent implements at least one type of projects.
The overall conclusion of this section is that yardstick competition has no
eﬀect whatsoever on the risk of underproviding valuable projects.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The usual presumption is that decentralized decision makers are more account-
able. One possible reason is that decentralization allows performance comparison.
In this paper we examine the role of yardstick competition for improving polit-
ical decisions. Can yardstick competition make politicians more accountable?
It is well known that in a general principal-agent relationships within a corre-
lated environment, incentive schemes based on relative performance can enhance
(Holmstrom, 1982) and even restore (Shleifer, 1985) eﬃciency. However, in po-
litical agency, voters are restricted to a very crude incentive scheme which is to
re-elect or to vote their politicians out. In this context, Besley and Smart (2001)
have shown that the eﬀect of yardstick competition can go either way, depending
on the residual degree of con￿dence about politicians.
20In this paper we use a diﬀerent political agency framework and show that yard-
stick competition cannot go the wrong way, although in several cases it has no
eﬀect at all. Our political agency model is similar to Coate and Morris (1995). In
this model, ineﬃciency arises from the fact that politicians may use non-valuable
public projects as an indirect and disguised method of channeling resources to
some special interest when more transparent transfer would not ￿nd political
support. Ineﬃciency arises also from the fact that politicians seeking reelection
may refrain from undertaking valuable projects when voters are suspicious about
these projects. Assuming symmetric information between politicians across ju-
risdictions, we ￿nd that yardstick competition may discourage some particular
form of ineﬃciency but does not aﬀect the general risk that at least one type of
incumbent in one jurisdiction will behave ineﬃciently. It has also no eﬀect on the
risk of not undertaking valuable projects (whose outcome is uncertain).
Clearly these ￿ndings are not conclusive and more work needs to be done
to assess whether yardstick competition can improve the force of the electoral
sanction. In future research we would like to see how yardstick competition
could improve the residual con￿dence about politicians. To make this residual
con￿dence endogenous, we can add to the picture some opportunistic politicians
who trade oﬀ the current bene￿t from not acting in the public interest and the
loss in reputation. The idea is that yardstick competition may reinforce the
reputation loss and reduce the incentive of opportunistic type for abusing power.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
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From Assumption 3, ￿ λ < 1. Now suppose by contradiction that there exists a
PBE in which both types of incumbent in both jurisdictions behave eﬃciently for
λI > ￿ λ.W ep r o c e e di nt w os t e p s .I nt h e￿rst step we prove that for any λI > ￿ λ
any PBE with eﬃcient behavior involves no bad incumbent making positive cash
transfers. Then, in a second step, we show that there cannot be a PBE in which
bothtypes of incumbent behave eﬃciently and refrain from making cash transfers.
Step 1:n oc a s ht r a n s f e r s
Eﬃcient behavior implies that in both jurisdictions, when θ = θ0, ag o o d
incumbent makes a project-transfer decision (N,0) a n dab a di n c u m b e n tc h o o s e s
21(N,0) or (N,T0).W h e n θ = θ1, whatever the jurisdiction, a good incumbent
chooses (P,0) and a bad incumbent chooses (P,0) or (P,T1).T h u s ,w h e nv o t e r s
do not observe any cash transfer (T =0 ) , they are unable to distinguish between
the two types of incumbent. As a result, in both jurisdictions, the voters￿ beliefs
consistent with this eﬃcient equilibrium behaviour must be such that
α(P,0,B H, ￿ R), α(P,0,B L, ￿ R) and α(N,0,0, ￿ R) ≥ λI,
for any record ￿ R observed in the other jurisdiction.
Now consider that in equilibrium a bad incumbent (whatever his jurisdiction)
chooses to make a cash transfer T0 when θ = θ0. (The other case where he
chooses T1 when θ = θ1 can be treated similarly.) By making a cash transfer
he will reveal himself, α(N,T0,0, ￿ R)=0∀ ￿ R, and thus get a payoﬀ of v∗
b(0,0).
However by giving up the transfer and choosing (N,0) instead he would get
vb(0,0) + δp(N,0,0)v∗
b(0,0),w h e r ep(N,0,0) is the incumbent￿s probability of
reelection when its voters observe the record (N,0,0). The latter probability
depends on the foreign incumbent￿s identity and observed behavior. In any case,
it will be computed as a linear combination of beliefs of the type α(N,0,0, ￿ R),
which have just been shown to be larger than λI. We have, therefore, that
vb(0,0) + δp(N,0,0)v
∗
b(0,0) ≥ vb(0,0) + δλIv
∗
b(0,0).
From the de￿nition of ￿ λ,t h i sp a y o ﬀ from choosing (N,0) exceeds the payoﬀ
v∗
b(0,0) from choosing (N,T0). Thus equilibrium cannot involve the bad incum-
bent making cash transfer when θ = θ0 (and similarly when θ = θ1).
Step 2: non-existence of eﬃcient equilibrium
We must prove that there exists no PBE in which both incumbents behave
eﬃciently given that (from Step 1) there cannot be cash transfer made in such
equilibrium. Suppose the contrary. Then eﬃcient behavior and no cash trans-
fer imply that the decision to implement or not the project cannot involve any
reputation loss. Thus
α(P,0,B H, ￿ R)=α(P,0,B L, ￿ R)=α(N,0,0, ￿ R)=λI,
for any record ￿ R observed in the other jurisdiction. But this leads to a con-
tradiction because the payoﬀ to a bad incumbent choosing (N,0) would be
vb(0,0) + δλIv∗
b(0,0) (for any record ￿ R observed in the other jurisdiction) which
from Assumption 2 is less than what he can get by deviating from the eﬃ-
cient decision (i.e., by choosing (P,0) when θ = θ0 which yields a payoﬀ of
vb(B(θ0),R)+δλIv∗
b(0,0)).Q E D
227.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Part (i). We ￿rst prove that, for all ρ ∈ (0,1),t h e r ei saλ
∗(ρ) < 1 such that
there exists a PBE involving strategy S when λI ≥ λ
∗(ρ).
We ￿rst derive the conditions under which strategy S is an equilibrium play
for both types of incumbent in both jurisdictions. Regarding the good incum-
bent, we know from monotone beliefs that he will never make cash transfers,
and thus (by Assumption 1) he will always choose (N,0) when θ = θ0.T h e
only requirement for a good incumbent to behave according to strategy S is
thus to prefer (P,0) over (N,0) when facing a project θ1. Since this must be
true for all project and politician types in the other jurisdiction we must have:
vg(B(θ1)) + δpg(θ1;θ,j)vg(0) ≥ (1 + δ)vg(0), ∀θ ∈ {θ0,θ1},j ∈ {g,b} abroad
(where the LHS is the discounted payoﬀ from choosing (P,0) and the RHS is
the discounted payoﬀ from choosing (N,0) getting reelected for sure). Using the
ranking (1) of voters￿ beliefs induced by strategy S, we know that the lowest
probability of reelection is pg(θ1;θ0,g). We have thus the following condition for
the good incumbent to behave according to S:
pg(θ1;θ0,g) ≥ 1 −
vg(B(θ1))−vg(0)
δvg(0) . (4)
We now derive the conditions under which strategy S is an equilibrium play
for bad incumbent.W h e n θ = θ0, we know from part (ii) of Assumption 3 and
monotone beliefs that the payoﬀ from choosing (N,0) with guaranteed reelection
exceeds the payoﬀ from choosing (N,T0) with no chance of reelection. We thus
need to ensure that the bad incumbent also prefers (P,0) over (N,0) for all
project and politician types in the other jurisdiction. This requires, vb(B(θ0),R)+
δpb(θ0;θ,j)v∗
b(0,0) ≥ vb(0,0)+δv∗
b(0,0), ∀θ ∈ {θ0,θ1},j∈ {g,b}. This condition
is less likely to be satis￿ed when probability of reelection is the lowest: that
is, pb(θ0;θ0,g). We have thus the following condition for the bad incumbent to
b e h a v ea c c o r d i n gt oSw h e nθ = θ0:




When θ = θ1, the discounted payoﬀ from choosing (P,0) is vb(B(θ1),R)+
δpb(θ1;θ,j)v∗
b(0,0). It is easily shown that for any θ ∈ {θ0,θ1} and j ∈ {g,b}, we
have that pb(θ1;θ,j) >p b(θ0;θ,j). Therefore, the payoﬀ from choosing (P,0) is
larger when θ = θ1 than when θ = θ0, which implies that condition (5) guarantees
that the bad incumbent does not prefer (N,0) when θ = θ1.I tr e m a i n st od e r i v e
the condition for the incumbent to prefer (P,0) over (P,T1) for all project and
politician types in the other jurisdiction. Choosing (P,T1) destroys any chance of
23reelection yielding a payoﬀ v∗
b(B(θ1),R).C h o o s i n g(P,0) the lowest probability






We now combine conditions (4), (5), and (6). We also use the facts (i) that all
the probabilities of reelections in the RHS of these conditions are increasing with
λI, and (ii) that pg(θ1;θ,g)=pb(θ1;θ,g). That allows us to derive the threshold
λ
∗(ρ) such that all three conditions are satis￿ed when λI > λ
∗(ρ).I np a r t i c u l a r ,
We also use the fact λ




















Assumptions 1-3 guarantee that the two RHS are below one, and by construc-
tion all the left-hand side terms are increasing in λI. Therefore there exists such
a λ
∗(ρ) < 1.
Part (ii). The ￿nding that λ
∗(ρ) > λ
∗(1/2) for all ρ > 1/2 follows directly from
part (ii) of Lemma 1: since reelection probabilities are higher in the absence of
correlation, a lower initial reputation is needed to meet (7) when ρ =1 /2 than
when ρ > 1/2.
Part (iii). From Subsection 4.2, we know that pb(θ0;θ0,g)=θ0αHN+(1−θ0)αLN
and pb(θ1;θ0,g)=θ1αHN+(1−θ1)αLN. Using the de￿nitions of αHN and αLN,i t
is easy to establish that the two probabilities of reelection are equal to zero in the
case of perfect (positive) correlation (ρ =1 ). It is therefore clear that condition
(7) cannot be met. QED
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